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Abstract Many people argue that history makes a special difference to the subjects
of biology and psychology, and that history does not make this special difference to
other parts of the world. This paper will show that historical properties make no more
or less of a difference to biology or psychology than to chemistry, physics, or other
sciences. Although historical properties indeed make a certain kind of difference to
biology and psychology, this paper will show that historical properties make the same
kind of difference to geology, sociology, astronomy, and other sciences. Similarly,
many people argue that nonhistorical properties make a special difference to the non-
biological and the nonpsychological world. This paper will show that nonhistorical
properties make the same difference to all things in the world when it comes to their
causal behavior and that historical properties make the same difference to all things in
the world when it comes to their distributions. Although history is special, it is special
in the same way to all parts of the world.
Keywords Natural kind · Essential properties · Explanation · Behavior ·
Historical properties · Generalizations · Distributions · Causal activity ·
Historical kinds · Copied kinds · Real kinds · Prediction
1 Introduction
Since work by Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and Tyler Burge, philosophers have
increasingly assigned ontological status and roles to historical properties in the study
of language, psychology, and biology. Enc (1995) argues that the supervenience
bases of certain behaviors and psychological states include historical properties.
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Elder (1995, 1996) and Enc (1995) argue that certain behaviors and biological devices
essentially include historical properties. Elder (1995, 1996), Griffiths (1996, 1999),
and Millikan (1996, 1999, 2000) argue that certain substances and biological devices
are members of real or natural kinds, as opposed to conventional or nominal ones, in
virtue of their historical properties.
Although the arguments of Elder, Enc, Griffiths, and Millikan contain interest-
ing differences, they also share the common view that historical properties mark an
important difference between the biological and the nonbiological world—and, on
many related views, between the psychological and the nonpsychological world. This
paper is part of a larger project designed to show that historical properties make no
more or less of a difference to biology or psychology than to chemistry, physics, or
other sciences. Although historical properties indeed make a certain kind of difference
to biology and psychology, this paper will show that historical properties make the
same kind of difference to geology, sociology, astronomy, and other sciences. The view
that history makes a special difference to biology or psychology leads to two problems
that we can call (1) confusion and (2) dependence. The confusion problem involves an
alleged analogy proposed by Elder, Griffiths, and Millikan between an essential role
that historical properties serve for ‘historical kinds’ and an essential role that internal
properties serve for ‘eternal kinds’. A distinction by Waters (1998) between generaliza-
tions about distributions, on the one hand, and generalizations about causal regularities,
on the other hand, will help make clear that historical properties serve the same roles for
historical and eternal kinds and that nonhistorical properties serve the same roles for
historical and eternal kinds. Whether historical properties serve an epistemic role in
making predictions or generalizations about causal behavior is a contingent matter both
for biology and psychology, on the one hand, and for any other science, on the other
hand. In contrast, historical properties serve an essential role in making generalizations
about distributions in all of the sciences—not just biology and psychology. Similarly,
nonhistorical properties serve an essential role in making generalizations about causal
behavior in all of the sciences, not just those sciences “harder” (or “softer”) than biol-
ogy and psychology. I will discuss these roles and how they relate to natural kinds in
Sect. 2 (addressing the confusion problem, where the confusion is between what kind
of properties explain generalizations about distributions and what kind of properties
explain generalizations about causal regularities).
Closely related to the confusion problem, the dependence problem involves a dif-
ficulty in separating the epistemic grounds or reasons that we have for making certain
predictions and generalizations, on the one hand, from the ontological grounds or
features of the world that make such predictions and generalizations successful, on
the other hand. Elder and Enc both argue that historical properties have ontological
significance because of the indispensable role that these properties seem to play in the
warranted predictions and generalizations about behavior that we make with frequent
success. The problem is that the historical properties are not really indispensable. Their
apparent indispensability depends on facts about us and such things as the extent of our
knowledge, ignorance, and technological development. This dependence on the (con-
tingent and epistemic) use of historical properties is a problem insofar as ontological
factors such as the essential properties of things outside of our minds are not supposed
to depend on contingent facts about our minds. I will discuss this problem in Sect. 3.
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2 Confusion
2.1 Introduction
Do products of natural selection such as tiger hearts and the mating dances of stickle-
back fish constitute natural kinds? On the one hand, these products are groupings over
which we can run informative and warranted inductions with non-accidental success.
This is a common feature of natural kinds. On the other hand, the reason why the
members of these groupings are like one another is that they share a history of being
copied from previous members under environmental selection pressures. This is a
less common feature of natural kinds. The reason why members of traditional natural
kinds such as water and gold are like one another is that they share a common micro
or internal structure rather than a common history. The products of natural selection
show that the first common feature of natural kinds about induction may be more
important than the second common feature about microstructure in distinguishing real
or natural kinds from conventional or nominal kinds. Hearts and mating dances are
not conventional groupings even though the reasons that members of these groups are
like one another are different from the reasons that members of groupings of water
and gold are like one another.
Elder (1995, 1996), Griffiths (1996, 1999), and Millikan (1996, 1999, 2000,
Chap. 2), argue in this manner for a revision in the traditional account of natural kinds.
Biological devices such as organs and behaviors that result from a history of selection
and copying constitute members of what Elder calls ‘copied kinds’ and Millikan calls
‘historical kinds’. Elder and Millikan aim to broaden the category of natural kind so
that copied or historical kinds, on the one hand, and more traditional natural kinds, on
the other hand, are two kinds of real kind. One way to distinguish one real kind from
another is by the reason or principle that accounts for why their respective members
are like one another. These reasons or principles explain the likenesses and provide
the essences of the kinds. In Millikan’s terms, the essence of a real kind provides the
ontological ground for the successful inductions we can make about its members. In
Elder’s terms, the essence of a real kind explains why we are warranted in making
successful inductions about them. On both of their views, the reason why members of
historical kinds are like one another is that they share certain historical properties about
past copying and selection. Elder and Millikan believe that the essences of historical
kinds consist in these historical properties.
Let us follow Millikan in calling traditional natural kinds ‘eternal kinds’. The
essences of eternal kinds consist in their respective internal microstructures that pro-
vide the reasons why the members of the kind are like one another. According to Elder,
Griffiths, and Millikan, certain historical properties of historical kinds are analogous
to certain microstructural properties of eternal kinds. These analogues are supposed to
provide the respective ontological grounds and epistemological warrant for successful
inductions about historical and eternal kinds.
There are three main problems with the analogy that Elder, Griffiths, and Millikan
propose. First, historical properties play the same role in explaining certain likenesses
among members of eternal kinds as they play in explaining certain likenesses among
members of historical kinds. Historical properties serve the same role in explaining
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what we can call the distributive likenesses of both historical and eternal kinds.
Second, nonhistorical properties play the same role in providing the ontological
grounds for successful inductions about the causal behavior of members of both eter-
nal and historical kinds. Third, whether historical or nonhistorical properties play an
epistemological role in warranting inductions about the causal behavior of histori-
cal or eternal kinds reflects contingent facts about human knowledge, ignorance, and
technological development, not the essential properties of real kinds.
These three problems with the alleged analogy between historical and nonhistor-
ical properties highlight a confusion between two different kinds of generalizations
that Waters (1998) calls distributions and causal regularities. Historical properties
explain generalizations about distributions—inside and outside of biology. Similarities
in nonhistorical properties explain generalizations about causal regularities—inside
and outside of biology.
2.2 History explains certain generalizations: the distributive ones
Millikan chose the word ‘eternal’ for eternal kinds because she believes that the his-
torical location of their members in time and space plays no role in explaining the
likenesses among their members. However, these members are just as much the prod-
ucts of historical processes as the members of historical kinds are. There are specific
historical reasons why the vast majority of glaciers, oceans, rivers, and lakes on the
Earth contain a compound comprised of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom
that are chemically bonded in a certain way. The vast majority of liquid containers
on the Earth contain a liquid with this microstructure as a result of a historical pro-
cess that dates back to the big bang, with past properties of our galaxy, solar system,
sun, atmosphere, and planetary development playing key roles (Kasting and Catling
2003). Of course, the laws of chemistry and physics played key roles in these historical
processes. Nonetheless, in order to explain why so many liquids on the Earth have a
similar microstructure and why so many Earthly cavities contain liquids that have a
similar microstructure, we need to appeal to the historical processes through which
various natural laws and elements resulted in this distribution of liquids.
In addition, the distributions of members of eternal kinds depend on historical and
ongoing processes in which environmental properties play crucial roles. For instance,
the distribution of water on the Earth depends on the intricacies of the greenhouse
effect, the water cycle, the organic carbon cycle, and the carbonate silicate cycle.
The presence of certain gases in the atmosphere helps maintain temperatures that
make possible a dynamic equilibrium between the retention of certain forms of water
and the production of certain gases. The current distribution of different forms of
water on the Earth is highly contingent on past and ongoing environmental processes
(Kump et al. 2004, Chaps. 3–5, 8).1
Historical location in time and space indeed plays an important role in explaining
similarities in both internal structures (such as H2O molecules) and dispositions (such
1 See McKitrick (2003) for some of the metaphysical details of how what appear to be intrinsic properties
may really depend on extrinsic properties.
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as the goal-directed behavior that results from either operant conditioning or natural
selection).2 Historical properties explain and provide the ontological ground for gen-
eralizations about the distributions of things that share such similarities. Historical
properties serve this role for generalizations about the distributions of water and gold
as well as stickleback fish and tiger hearts. To be sure, it is highly unlikely that any
two samples of water or gold will share exactly the same internal properties just as it
is highly unlikely that any two members of a biological species or any particular organ
of two members of the same biological species will share exactly the same internal
properties. The differences that accompany the similarities in both kinds of cases are
due to contingent features of the historical processes that lead to the distributions.
In both kinds of cases, the historical processes make possible successful general-
izations about distributions of certain similarities. For instance, the next human we
see is likely to have two legs and a heart with four chambers, and the next Earth ocean
or lake that we analyze is likely to contain H2O, for the same respective historical
reasons. The main point that Waters (1998) helps make especially clear is that sim-
ilarities in the nonhistorical properties of legs, hearts, and samples of water explain
and provide the ontological grounds for any successful generalizations that we make
about regularities in their causal behavior. The analogy that Elder, Griffiths, and Mil-
likan propose between the historical properties of historical kinds and the internal
properties of eternal kinds confuses distributive and nondistributive questions about
why members of real kinds are like one another.3 If we keep these different questions
separate, we can see that historical properties serve the same roles for all real kinds,
and that nonhistorical properties serve the same roles for all real kinds.
2.3 Nonhistorical properties provide the ontological grounds for generalizations
about the causal behavior of members of eternal and historical kinds
Although historical information about the distributive properties of a real kind may
help us make successful generalizations about the causal behavior of the kind members,
it only does so by providing us with information about the nonhistorical properties of
those members (Waters 1998, pp. 16–17, 19–20). When it comes to explaining gener-
alizations about causal regularities, as opposed to distributions, historical properties
serve only a heuristic role. Historical properties may tell us why kind members share
similar properties. However, as we will see in more detail in Sect. 3, the nonhistorical
2 See Waters (1998, pp. 14–15, 23–25) on how history explains distributive generalizations about the two
different kinds of similarities. Notice that Millikan (1999, pp. 48–49, 54–55); Millikan (2000, pp. 18–20,
23–25) seems to focus on generalizations about tokens of what Waters calls ‘theoretical kinds’. Nonethe-
less, it is clear that Millikan intends her claims also to apply to more broad functional cases, such as Enc’s
example of the play bow of social carnivores (1995, p. 539).
3 The idea here about the connection between history and generalizations about distributions as opposed to
generalizations about causal regularities is similar to Sober’s (1995) claim that although natural selection
explains the frequencies of traits in populations, more proximate and developmental facts about individual
organisms explain why they each have the traits that they do. For related points, see Miller (1978), Garfinkel
(1981), and Enc and Adams (1992).
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properties of those members are causally responsible for similarities in their behavior.4
Why do so many liquids in different ocean basins on Earth share a similar molecular
structure, on the one hand, is a distributive question about certain features of the his-
tory of the Earth’s mantle, atmosphere, and planetary bombardment. Why do so many
liquids in different ocean basins on Earth boil and freeze at certain temperatures, on
the other hand, is a nonhistorical question about causal regularities in the behavior of
those liquids.
To be sure, the causal inefficacy of historical properties is confirmed on virtually
all the major accounts of causation (e.g., manipulability/intervention, difference mak-
ing, contrastive, ANOVA, etc.). Experiments designed to test the causal efficacy of
historical properties will always produce negative results. Basically, if you hold every-
thing nonhistorical the same and change only historical properties, you will never get
any causal difference (that is not due to probabilistic dispositions of the nonhistorical
properties). If there is some causal pathway alleged to include causally active his-
torical properties, whenever we construct the same pathway with different historical
properties we never get different effects; any different effects we do get will only
be the same different effects determined by the probabilistic dispositions of causally
active nonhistorical properties.5 When it comes to causal behavior above the sub-
atomic level,6 nonhistorical properties do all the causal work. Just to be clear, the idea
is that since nonhistorical properties are causally responsible for any and all causal
behavior, historical properties can only be helpful in making successful predictions
or generalizations about causal behavior if and when they serve a strictly heuristic
role by providing information about the nonhistorical properties doing the real causal
work.7
Let us return to a concrete example that illustrates the essential role that historical
properties serve (for all real kinds) and a related concrete example that illustrates the
essential role that nonhistorical properties serve (for all real kinds). Why do so many
reproductively isolated freshwater stickleback fish have less body armor in terms of
fewer lateral plates and smaller dorsal and pelvic spines than marine sticklebacks? Part
of the answer to this question about the distribution of stickleback bones begins with the
end of the last ice age when melting and receding glaciers left behind thousands of lakes
and streams for sticklebacks to colonize (Bell and Foster 1994). Differences in preda-
tors, evasion options, and calcium availability created selection pressures for fewer and
4 To appeal to historical properties as the ontological ground for successful inductions about nondistributive
generalizations is to commit a systematic ’modest embarrassment’ on my understanding of Boyd’s terms
(1999b, pp. 70, 74–75).
5 See Slutsky (2001) for related discussion and argument.
6 According to standard accounts of quantum mechanics, historical properties seem to have nonlocal effects
on particles entangled in quantum mechanical states. However, due to quantum decoherence, all biological
and psychology subjects are too large to become entangled in this way that seems to confer causal power
on the historical properties of certain subatomic particles.
7 This claim does not require determinism. We can restate it in terms of the probabilistic dispositions of any
causally active nonhistorical properties. See Prior et al. (1982). As Walsh (1999) makes clear, environmental
properties in many contexts either affect causal powers of intrinsic properties or make causal contributions
themselves. Nonetheless, in no contexts do historical properties ever affect causal powers or make causal
contributions themselves. See also Kim (1991).
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smaller bones. The isolated populations of sticklebacks adapted quickly to their new
environments in a remarkable display of parallel evolution (McKinnon and Rundle
2002; McKinnon et al. 2004).
However, suppose we make generalizations, not about the distribution of stickle-
back bones, but about how marine sticklebacks survive encounters with soft-mouthed
predators and freshwater sticklebacks survive encounters with large invertebrate pre-
dators. In these cases, the size and number of stickleback spines and plates, along with
other nonhistorical properties such as the size and shape of predator gapes, is causally
responsible for the regularities in the encounters.
For one more example, geologists searching for oil and natural gas generally do
not conduct seismic surveys over areas dominated by igneous or metamorphic rocks.
Rather, they conduct their surveys over certain areas dominated by sedimentary rocks.
The distribution of oil and gas throughout the Earth is determined by historical pro-
cesses that transform biomass and organic materials into hydrocarbons during histor-
ical processes involving various pressures and endothermic reactions. Heavy layers
of sediment foster these historical processes. Such geological processes combine over
time with others such as maturation and migration, resulting in the distributions of oil
and gas in the Earth today (Press et al. 2003, Chaps. 8, 21, 22). The historical properties
of the aforementioned geological processes explain successful generalizations about
where we can and cannot find Earthly oil and gas. Nonetheless, only certain nonhis-
torical properties of oil and gas explain generalizations about their causal behavior.
Similar claims with different details apply to the distribution and causal behavior of all
other substances in the universe, including gold in the Earth, planets in solar systems,
stars and solar systems in galaxies, and gases in regions of interstellar space.
3 Dependence
3.1 Introduction
Another way of expressing one of the main points in Sect. 2 is that when we ask for an
explanation for generalizations about distributions, we are really asking an historical
question about how—through what historical processes—did the distributions come
about. In this sense, we can reasonably contend that the relevant historical properties
are essential to distributions. Many people have defended this contention about pop-
ulation level phenomena, with distributions being one way we talk about features of
populations. In contrast, one of the assumptions in Sect. 2 is that historical properties
are not essential to causal activity, causal behavior, causal regularities, or explana-
tions of generalizations about causal matters. However, as noted in Sect. 1, many
people claim that historical properties are essential to biological and psychological
subjects of various kinds. For instance, Elder and Enc both argue that the only way
to explain the successful predictions and generalizations we frequently make about
functional behavior is to revise our understanding of the supervenience bases of that
behavior to include historical properties. They both argue that since historical prop-
erties are indispensable to making successful predictions and generalizations about
certain behaviors, we should revise our understanding of the supervenience base of
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those behaviors essentially to include historical properties. Here is the general form
of argument used most clearly by Enc (1995) and Elder (1995, 1996)8:
The alleged indispensability of historical properties argument
(1) If certain historical properties are indispensable to certain scientific practices
about behavior (predicting, generalizing, and/or explaining successful predic-
tions and generalizations), then those historical properties are both part of the
supervenience base of and are essential to that behavior.
(2) Certain historical properties are indispensable to certain scientific practices about
certain behaviors (predicting, generalizing, and/or explaining successful predic-
tions and generalizations).
(3) Hence, certain historical properties are both part of the supervenience base of
and are essential to certain behaviors.9
It is important to distinguish between two different interpretations of “indispens-
able” in this argument. First, we could interpret indispensable to mean indispensable
always, everywhere, for everyone and anyone. We can call this interpretation “ideal-
ized agent indispensability”, since the indispensability involved would apply even to
idealized agents with complete knowledge of everything. Second, we could interpret
indispensable to mean indispensable to a particular agent in a particular place at a
particular time. We can call this interpretation “actual agent indispensability”, since
it involves actual agents such as us.
On the idealized agent interpretation of indispensability, premise 2 in the argument
above looks false. It is not clear that historical properties are not always in principle
dispensable when we have adequate knowledge of all relevant nonhistorical proper-
ties (including intrinsic properties as well as contemporaneous relational and extrinsic
properties). If our knowledge of relevant nonhistorical properties is not ideal, then
knowledge of historical properties may serve a heuristic role by providing informa-
tion about the relevant nonhistorical properties. In that case, however, the historical
properties are not really indispensable. Similarly, on the actual agent interpretation of
indispensability, premise 1 in the argument above looks false. It is not clear why or
how the contingent needs of particular agents could reveal the ontology or essential
properties of things in the world.
In Sect. 3.2, I will criticize the idealized agent interpretation of indispensability
by presenting three different kinds of evidence for denying the truth of premise 2
on that interpretation. In Sect. 3.3, I will criticize the actual agent interpretation of
indispensability by questioning the connection (presented in premise 1) between con-
tingent epistemic needs in the minds of scientific agents and the essential properties
of biological and psychological subjects outside the minds of those agents.
8 See also, for instance, Griffiths (1997) and Boyd (1999c).
9 Please remember that this argument focuses on scientific practices, such as predictions and generalizations,
about (causal) behavior. In contrast, scientific practices that focus on generalizations about distributions
or frequencies of traits in populations, and scientific practices that focus on taxonomizing (distributions
of) traits, organisms, populations, or species in terms of phylogenetic history, for instance, require the
historically oriented approach/analysis provided and discussed in Sect. 2. Classifying behavior (histori-
cally or otherwise) for the purposes of operant conditioning, or for making nondistributive predictions or
generalizations, however, does indeed fall within the purview of this argument.
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3.2 The idealized agent interpretation of indispensability
There are three different kinds of evidence that, taken together, count against the truth
of premise 2 in the argument above. We can label them exhibits (A), (B), and (C).
Roughly, exhibit (A) provides metaphysical evidence, exhibit (B) provides empiri-
cal evidence, and exhibit (C) provides epistemological (and empirical) evidence that
premise 2 of the argument above is not true on the idealized agent interpretation of
indispensability.
Exhibit (A) is the doctrine known as the causal completeness of physics, or the
causal closure of the physical (Papineau 2001, 2009). Above the subatomic level,
physics does not recognize or allow for the causal efficacy of historical properties.
Biological and psychological subjects do not exist below the atomic level. According
to the causal completeness of physics, the causal activity of biological and psycholog-
ical subjects depends wholly on nonhistorical properties.10
This is not the place to undertake a detailed analysis of the metaphysics of his-
torical properties. However, a few comments will suffice both to provide grounds for
thinking that historical properties are not physical and to elucidate the aforementioned
claims about exhibit A. The notion of historical properties requires a conception of
persistence. In order for something to have historical properties, that thing must have
persisted from one time to another; in order for something in the present to have his-
torical properties, that thing must have persisted from some time in the past to the
present. On an endurance account of persistence, the historical properties of some-
thing at a time T are really facts or information about the nonhistorical properties of
that thing before time T. In other words, the historical properties of something at a
time T consist in facts or information about the past intrinsic properties, past con-
temporaneous relational properties, and past contemporaneous extrinsic properties of
that thing before T. Historical properties themselves leave no physical trace on their
property bearers. The physical sciences cannot measure, record, or detect them. The
only place in the world where we can find historical properties is in the brains/minds
of the people who have beliefs (or other psychological states) about them. However,
the neurological/mental states of people that either allow those people to think about
historical properties or that consist in those people thinking about historical properties
are different from the historical properties themselves. In this sense, on the endurance
account of persistence, historical properties are not physical.11
On a perdurance account of persistence, there really is no such thing as historical
properties. According to perdurance, what we ordinarily think of as the historical prop-
erties of something are really the intrinsic, relational, or extrinsic properties of earlier
(or different) temporal parts of that thing. On either of these two major accounts of
persistence, historical properties are excluded by the causal completeness of physics
10 Recall that, as argued in Sect. 2, the frequency of traits in populations or distributions is a different
matter—in such cases, historical properties are highly relevant if not essential and/or indispensable.
11 Shoemaker (1980) seems to agree. See in particular his remarks on “mere-cambridge” properties.
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because they are either not physical (according to endurance) or not really historical
(or according to perdurance).12
Exhibit (B) consists of evidence showing that, in principle if not in practice (and
in the future if not in the present), we can successfully predict and explain causal
behavior by appealing solely to nonhistorical properties. The first part of exhibit (B)
involves the Synthetic Telepathy joint research programs conducted by teams at the
University of California at Irvine, Carnegie Mellon University, and New York Univer-
sity. This U.S. military funded project (the Department of Defense Multi-disciplinary
University Research Initiative, MURI, program) involves basic research needed to
make possible brain–computer interfaces for decoding thoughts from brain scans and
communicating them to intended targets. Numerous military field applications include
communication without vision or speech, mental control of machinery/weaponry, lie
detection, and other forms of mind reading (D’Zmura et al. 2009; Srinivasan et al.
2009).
The second part of exhibit (B) involves Jack Gallant’s research at UC Berkeley that
uses computational encoding models accurately to interpret, decode, and predict brain
activity. The popular press picked up one of his labs papers on this matter (Kay et al.
2008) and reported it widely. Gallant uses his models to decode brain activity, pro-
viding a direct and principled way to do “brain reading”, and to build brain–machine
interfaces and neural prosthetics (Naselaris et al. 2009). Similarly, one part of Kend-
rick Kay’s research (working in collaboration with Gallant’s lab) at UC Berkeley is
designed to decode brain activity in order to determine what people are perceiving.
For instance, one of Kay’s papers (co-authored with Gallant) has the telling and pro-
vocative title, “I can see what you can see” (Kay and Gallant 2009).
The third part of exhibit (B) involves John-Dylan Haynes research as the Profes-
sor for Theory and Analysis of Large Scale Brain Signals at the Bernstein Center
for Computational Neuroscience at Humboldt University of Berlin as well as a Senior
Researcher (for the research group “Attention and Awareness”) at the Max Planck Insti-
tute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences in Leipzig, Germany (Haynes and Rees
2006; Haynes et al. 2007; Haynes 2008, 2009). Haynes is working similarly towards
predicting people’s thoughts with scans of brain activity that will allow for such things
as detection of deception, the mental control of computers and artificial prostheses,
and even involuntary market research.
The fourth part of exhibit (B) consists of work at Carnegie Mellon University by
Marcel Just, Tom Mitchell, and colleagues involving development of statistical algo-
rithms both that analyze fMRI data and that learn to identify and track the cognitive
processes that give rise to the fMRI data. This kind of neuroimaging uses classifiers to
find stimulus unique patterns of brain activation both to form theories that connect cog-
nitive processes with brain functions and that allow, or that teach, algorithms/machines
to detect cognitive states (Just et al. 2010; Palatucci et al. 2009; Shinkareva et al. 2008;
12 I rely here on a contentious but not uncommon connection between endurance and presentism, on the
one hand, and perdurance and eternalism, on the other hand. For relevant arguments, see Merricks (1994,
1995, 1999) as well as Carter and Hestevold (1994). Notice that the alleged subjects of historical properties
can include planets, continents, ecosystems, habitats, species, and individual organisms.
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Mitchell et al. 2008). We can follow others in accurately characterizing this work as
a form of “mind reading” and human psychology recognition/detection by machines.
Further parts of exhibit (B) could involve some of the reductionist research pro-
grams in neuroscience.13 One thing most if not all of them have in common along with
the other parts of exhibit (B) is an absence of historical properties in their research.
Enc and Adams (1992), Enc (1995), Elder (1995, 1996) and Ariew (2003) all affirm
premise 2 from the argument above and claim that we cannot successfully predict or
explain the causal behavior of certain psychological and biological subjects without
adequate understanding of the relevant historical properties leading up to that behav-
ior. The research programs summarized in exhibit (B), even in their infancy, seem to
provide evidence that calls into question the truth of premise 2.
Exhibit (C) involves a particular criticism of evolutionary psychology that Davies
(1996), Grantham and Nichols (1999), and Boyd (2001), seem independently to
have developed and converged upon. These authors discuss two different methods or
approaches to research that evolutionary psychologists explicitly use. One method
focuses on using evolutionary considerations and historical speculations about past
selection pressures to predict the existence and nature of mental modules and psycho-
logical capacities. The other method focuses on independently identified mental mod-
ules and psychological capacities discovered and confirmed by nonhistorical studies,
and then proceeds to provide evolutionary explanations for them. The aforementioned
critics concede (and even argue) that there are compelling arguments for the second,
explanatory method/approach, from which we can learn a great deal. In contrast, the
critics argue that the first, predictive method/approach is prone to develop unjustified
inferences and Panglossian forms of adaptationism.
To be sure, the first approach—characteristic of allegedly received wisdom—seems
to get things backwards. It is only through the study of nonhistorical properties that we
can obtain knowledge of historical properties in the first place as we make inferences
to facts about the past (Davies 2001, pp. 55–56, Chap. 5). Work by David Kingsley’s
lab at Stanford University (along with colleagues elsewhere) on stickleback fish illus-
trates this claim and provides evidence of several instances of it. Kingsley studied
the genetic changes behind the anatomical and subsequent/accompanying behavioral
differences between freshwater and marine sticklebacks summarized in Sect. 2.3, such
as the loss of hind fins, pelvic fins, and body armor in freshwater sticklebacks across
the Northern hemisphere. By selective breeding of sticklebacks from different pop-
ulations through mating and in vitro fertilization, Kingsley identified mutations in
particular genes that still produce the same proteins, but produce them in different
parts of the fish. In repeated tests on freshwater sticklebacks collected from different
local and global reproductively isolated populations, Kingsley similarly found causal
responsibility for other adapted traits through mutations in a single gene that did not
alter the protein produced by the gene but rather the locations in the developing fish
where the gene produced the relevant protein (Colosimo et al. 2004; Shapiro et al.
2004; Shapiro et al. 2006; Chan et al. 2010).
13 For instance, see John Bickle’s account of the mental in terms of molecular and cellular cognition
(Bickle et al. 2003; Bickle 2006a,b, 2007, 2008).
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These and similar experiments on the nonhistorical properties of live fish explain
and produce detailed knowledge of the speciation and parallel evolution from marine
to freshwater sticklebacks beginning 15,000 years ago and occurring in similar ways
today (McKinnon et al. 2004). These kinds of nonhistorical data and analyses include
work in quantitative genetics, genomics, population genetics, molecular evolution,
field studies, and developmental biology. The nonhistorical data collected with this
work and analyzed by Kingsley, members of his lab, colleagues, and Kingsley’s former
students with their own labs provide insights into how changes occur in evolution gen-
erally and in micro versus macroevolution in particular (Colosimo et al. 2004, 2005;
Shapiro et al. 2006; Shapiro et al. 2009; Kingsley and Peichel 2007; Miller et al. 2007;
Hendry et al. 2009; Kitano et al. 2009; Chan et al. 2010; Schluter et al. 2010). We will
elaborate on this approach in Sect. 3.3 (as well as in Sects. 3.3.1 and 3.3.2), along the
lines of exhibit (C) in this current Sect. 3.2, while discussing scientific practices of
using nonhistorical properties in order both to understand behavior and the contempo-
rary world, and to discover and understand the relevant historical properties that led
up to the contemporary world including much of the behavior in it.
3.3 The actual agent interpretation of indispensability
Recall the general indispensability argument from Sect. 3.1:
(1) If certain historical properties are indispensable to scientific practices about
behavior (predicting, generalizing, and/or explaining successful predictions and
generalizations), then those historical properties are both part of the superve-
nience base of and are essential to that behavior.
(2) Certain historical properties are indispensable to scientific practices about certain
behaviors (predicting, generalizing, and/or explaining successful predictions and
generalizations).
(3) Hence, certain historical properties are both part of the supervenience base of
and are essential to certain behaviors.
In Sect. 3.2, we used the idealized agent interpretation of indispensability to argue
that premise 2 is false. In this section, we will use the actual agent interpretation of
indispensability to argue that premise 1 is false. Although some scientists may need
to appeal to history in their attempts to explain behavior and their warranted success
in predicting it, this need presumably changes in accordance with their knowledge,
ignorance, and technology. It seems a plausible conjecture that scientific explananda
do not change in accordance with scientists’ contingent explanans.14 The essential
properties and the supervenience bases of behavior should not change in accordance
with the means that scientists use to predict and explain it. In that case, the need to
appeal to history in scientific practice does not constitute sufficient grounds to expand
supervenience bases or alleged essences to include historical properties.
If historical properties are in principle dispensable in engaging in and understanding
our predictive and explanatory practices about behavior, then we may want to ask why
14 Of course, explanans may make causal contributions to explananda. The assumption here is that they
make no noncausal contributions. See Boyd (1992).
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they are such a reliable guide in making accurate predictions. One way to answer this
question is to remember that relying on historical properties often leads to inaccurate
predictions and to exceptions to otherwise successful generalizations. The reason why
historical properties are not always reliable is that they do not always provide accu-
rate information about nonhistorical properties (Lauder 1995; Grantham and Nichols
1999, pp. 58–61). The reason why historical properties are often reliable is that they
do often provide accurate information about nonhistorical properties (Boyd 1999a,
pp. 166–167; 1999b, pp. 81–84; Saidel 2001, pp. 153–156). It seems a plausible con-
jecture that these co-variations are no accident. Nonhistorical properties provide the
ontological ground for what happens, and for what we can count on to happen, in the
future (Dretske 1998).15
We can elucidate this argument (against the actual agent interpretation of the indis-
pensability argument) and illustrate it with both imaginary and actual examples. Let
us begin with an imaginary example. Suppose that, at a time T, historical properties
are not indispensable to the predictions and explanations made by a group of scientists
called “S3” who study the mating behavior of stickleback fish. So, at time T, we cannot
use the indispensability argument to conclude that historical properties are essential
to and part of the supervenience base of the fish behavior that S3 is studying. Suppose
further that at a later time T + n, S3 loses a great deal of its data and equipment (such as
fish tanks, computer hard drives containing digital recordings and analyzed data about
stickleback courtship, etc). In addition, the same storm that damaged S3’s data and
equipment also caused a series of tragic electrical accidents that damaged the memo-
ries of the scientists in S3. Fortunately, some dusty biology books by Tinbergen and
others that contain reports of fossil records, past observations of and experiments on
live fish, and evolutionary arguments, escaped damage from the storm. So at time T + n,
certain historical properties (about stickleback courtship discussed in those books) that
were not indispensable to S3’s predictions and explanations of fish behavior at time
T become indispensable at time T + n. So we can use the indispensability argument to
conclude that historical properties are essential to and part of the supervenience base
of fish behavior at T + n but not at T. If no scientists other than S3 study sticklebacks, it
seems that, according to the indispensability argument, whether historical properties
are essential to stickleback behavior depends on whether a storm happens to cause
various amounts of damage, which seems to provide grounds for a reductio against
the actual agent interpretation of the indispensability argument.
We can further elucidate and illustrate this line of argument (against the actual
agent interpretation of the indispensability argument) with some actual examples.
Deborah McLennan, Professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biol-
ogy at the University of Toronto, used behavioral and morphological data (collected in
the field and the lab by herself and others) to develop a stickleback phylogenetic tree
that depicts genealogical relationships among various stickleback and related species
(McLennan et al. 1988; McLennan and McPhail 1989a,b; McLennan 1991, 1993).
With her tree in hand and using such considerations as comparisons with past members
of the same clade, McLennan compared the respective historical properties regarding
15 See also Sect. 3.2 as well as Sect. 2.3, especially note 7.
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male nuptial coloration and made successful predictions about it. For instance, one
main prediction is that red coloration on the ventrolateral surfaces of males should
either be more intensely red and/or positioned so as to be more visible to females
during courtship mating dances than before or after them. Collected data confirm
McLennan’s predictions. To be sure, Brooks and McLennan (1991) argue at length
for a version of the indispensability argument regarding the genealogy and phylog-
eny of sticklebacks (and other species) in order successfully to predict, explain, and
understand their behavior. So, according to the indispensability argument, historical
properties are essential to, and part of the supervenience base of, stickleback mating
behavior.
However, suppose that McLennan had become an investment banker (instead of
a scientist studying the evolution of courtship communication), and had never made
those successful predictions. Suppose further that no one else had used historical
properties to make those predictions that she in fact did make. As it turns out, actual
scientists before and after McLennan’s studies had already collected the data that
confirmed her predictions with nonhistorical properties simply by carefully observing
and experimenting with sticklebacks (Pelkwijk and Tinbergen 1937; Tinbergen 1951,
1952; Wilz 1970; Wooton 1973, 1984; Rowland 1984, 1994; Rowland and Sevenster
1985; Milinski and Bakker 1990; Bakker and Milinski 1991, 1993; Fitzgerald 1993;
Rowe et al. 2004). Since the actual agent interpretation of the indispensability argu-
ment requires historical properties actually to be indispensable to actual scientists
(premise 2 of the argument), we cannot use it to conclude that any historical prop-
erties are essential to any causal behavior if the work of no actual scientists makes
premise 2 true. Of course, we cannot infer that the conclusion of the indispensability
argument is false by showing that (the antecedent in the conditional in) premise 2
of the argument is false—both because any such conclusion would be based on an
invalid inference and because there do happen to be plenty of scientists around to
make versions of premise 2 true. Nonetheless, the first premise of the actual agent
interpretation of the indispensability argument remains implausible because it inap-
propriately makes the essential properties of things such as the behavior of organisms
living around the Earth depend on the contingent practices of scientists who may or
may not have the allegedly requisite thoughts about those organisms—such as those
involved in McLennan becoming a scientist rather than an investment banker.
To be sure, Rowe et al. (2004) provide an incredibly detailed account of stick-
leback nuptial coloration using entirely nonhistorical sciences.16 They analyze their
data and then propose/suggest/request evolutionary explanations of them. In contrast
to McLennan (McLennan et al. 1988; McLennan and McPhail 1989a,b; McLennan
1991, 1993), Rowe et al. (2004) did not use historical comparisons with past mem-
bers of the same clade to predict details of stickleback coloration. Rather, they simply
studied (nonhistorically) live stickleback coloration in great detail, and include/sug-
gest/request speculation about the coloration of past family members in evolutionary
explanations of their detailed nonhistorical findings. This method shares much in
16 See also Milinski and Bakker (1990) and Bakker and Milinski (1991, 1993). Rowland (1994) summarizes
much of the literature and McLennan (2007) covers more recent advances in the context of earlier literature.
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common with the one defended by Davies (1996), Grantham and Nichols (1999), and
Boyd (2001) in Exhibit (C) from Sect. 3.2.
Actual and intriguing examples are not hard to find. Ishikawa and Mori (2000)
and Ishikawa et al. (2006) identify and discuss a unique mating dance performed by
Japan Sea stickleback fish that differs from the mating dance performed by Pacific
(and Atlantic) Ocean sticklebacks. The traditional mating dance performed by Pacific
sticklebacks is known as the “zig zag” dance. Ishikawa and Mori call the different
mating dance of Japan Sea sticklebacks the “lateral display”. Kitano et al. (2007,
2008) identify and discuss the same mating dance of Japan Sea sticklebacks, though
they give it the possibly more descriptive name of the “rolling dance”. None of these
scientists started out knowing any evolutionary or other history of the rolling dance.
No one knows what it was selected for, what it was an adaptation to, how it increased
fitness or what past survival problem it helped solve. Nonetheless, these scientists
easily and clearly identified it as courtship behavior. With a bit of observation and
experiment, these and other scientists could see that males prepare a nest before they
perform the dance, that females frequently follow males to their nest and spawn after
males perform the dance, and that male fertilization follows the female spawning after
the dance.
In contrast to the claim that we need to know the history of this behavior in order
successfully to predict and explain it, Rowe et al. (2004) and Kitano et al. (2007,
2008) first identify and understand the subtle details and dynamics of this behav-
ior using nonhistorical sciences, and then—as a second step—they include, suggest,
and/or request evolutionary explanations for the behavior. In addition, as described in
exhibit (C) toward the end of Sect. 3.2, one of the leading approaches to providing
such explanations uses nonhistorical methods and nonhistorical properties involving
hybrid mating and genomic tools/analysis to learn about the genetic architecture of
evolutionary changes in courtship behavior, including the mechanisms underlying evo-
lutionary changes in neural circuitry. This work follows the steps of Kingsley’s lab in
using stickleback genetic and genomic studies to learn about the molecular basis of
vertebrate evolution more generally (Colosimo et al. 2004, 2005; Shapiro et al. 2006;
Shapiro et al. 2009; Kingsley and Peichel 2007; Miller et al. 2007; Kitano et al. 2009;
Schluter et al. 2010).
3.3.1 Enc’s (1995) version of the indispensability argument: a brief case study
Enc (1995) argues for a paradigm shift in how we understand certain classes of behav-
ior. He wishes to clarify and contrast “molar” behavior with behavior that consists in
specific muscle movements and precisely describable limb trajectories. Enc argues that
a version of the indispensability argument applies to molar behavior. Molar behavior
consists in “units of behavior” that are plastic and goal directed. His main example
is the behavior that results from operant conditioning on a pigeon to peck a key in
response to a flashing light. In this example, experimenters use the release of food as
reinforcement when key pecks correlate with the flashing light. Such molar behavior
is functional and is realized by many different muscle movements and limb trajecto-
ries. Enc contends that molar behavior is the proper explananda of psychology. He
argues that historical properties (in this case about the conditioning process on the
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pigeon) are indispensable to explaining molar behavior and to classifying behavior
for the purposes of operant conditioning. His arguments fall prey to the problems that
plague both the idealized agent and the actual agent interpretations of the general
indispensability argument.
The success of Enc’s arguments depends on unfairly restricting the competing can-
didates for the explanans of molar behavior. His unfair restrictions point toward the
apparent indispensability of historical properties. Revising the competing candidates
more fairly reveals the dispensability of historical properties. Enc proposes two main
candidates for the explanans of molar behavior. The first candidate consists in the
nonhistorical properties of the muscle movements and limb trajectories involved in
the behavior. The second candidate consists in the historical properties involved in the
conditioning, copying, or selection processes that led to the molar behavior. Enc argues
that since the first candidate does not provide us with an adequate explanans of the
behavior, we need to appeal to the second candidate, which Enc believes does provide
us with an adequate explanans. One problem here is that Enc does not fairly represent
the first, nonhistorical candidate explanans for competition with his preferred second,
historical explanans.
Let us illustrate this alleged unfairness with Enc’s primary example of the pigeon
that is conditioned to peck a key when a light flashes in order to receive food if the
key is pressed while the light is flashing. This behavior is indeed multiply realiz-
able by different muscle movements and limb trajectories that are directed toward
the more general goal of pecking the key (and receiving food), as opposed to some
more specific goal that consists in one particular set of muscle movements and limb
trajectories through which the pigeon pecks the key. The functional characterization
of this behavior is what Enc means by “molar units of behavior”. How can we under-
stand these molar units of behavior? If the only nonhistorical properties that we know
of this behavior are those of the pigeon’s muscles and limbs, then knowledge of the
historical properties about the pigeon’s past conditioning are indispensable for under-
standing the behavior and we can use the indispensability argument to conclude that
these historical properties are essential to the behavior.
However, suppose that we have knowledge of the nonhistorical properties of the
pigeon’s nervous system and environment in addition to knowledge of the nonhistorical
properties of the pigeon’s muscles and limbs. These additional nonhistorical properties
constitute the more fair nonhistorical candidate that Enc fails adequately to consider.
In this case, using the evidence from Sect. 3.2 against the idealized agent interpreta-
tion of the indispensability argument, we can argue that, in principle if not in practice
(and in the future if not in the present), we can explain the pigeon’s molar behavior
without any need for knowledge about the history of conditioning. We can argue in
this way because what does the causal work in generating the molar behavior are
the causally active nonhistorical properties (Enc 1995, pp. 528–529; Enc and Adams
1992, pp. 649–651). The nonhistorical properties of the muscles and limbs do indeed
serve a partial causal role in generating the molar behavior and so are part of a good
explanans. However, the nonhistorical properties of the nervous system that is con-
nected to the muscles and limbs (combined with the nonhistorical properties of the
environment), also serve a causal role, and these are the properties that make the
behavior molar rather than singular. To be sure, Lauder (1995) argues that morpholog-
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ical and phylogenetic studies often do not generate accurate predictions about func-
tional behavior because they often do not contain crucial information about motor
programs in the central nervous system. In addition, we can imagine many cases
in which what appear to be similar selection pressures and other relevant histori-
cal factors will, for various reasons, have resulted in nonhistorical properties with
different dispositions that have different effects in operant conditioning. Sometimes
historical properties can be misleading (Amundson and Lauder 1994, pp. 461–462;
Godfrey-Smith 1994, pp. 357–358; Walsh 1996, pp. 559–561; Walsh and Ariew 1996,
pp. 498–500).
Of course, if we lack adequate knowledge of the causally relevant nonhistorical
properties, we can use knowledge of historical properties as helpful pointers to them.
In such a case, we can use the actual agent interpretation of the indispensability argu-
ment to conclude that historical properties are essential to the behavior. The problem
is that, according to this argument, whether the historical properties are essential to
the behavior or not depends on how much knowledge of relevant nonhistorical prop-
erties we do and do not possess. As pointed out in Sect. 3.3, it seems implausible for
the essential properties of things outside of our minds to depend on things inside our
minds. The essential properties of things outside of our minds (and our bodies) should
not depend on our epistemic needs and whether or not we happen to possess or lack
adequate knowledge of the causally relevant nonhistorical properties.
Curiously, in an earlier paper co-authored with Fred Adams, Enc and Adams (1992,
pp. 649–653) seem explicitly to acknowledge related points. In that paper they make
clear that teleological considerations serve a strictly heuristic role in identifying struc-
tural (or dispositional) facts about certain nonhistorical properties, such as the behav-
ioral plasticity or molar units that they produce. On this view, although molar behavior
has a nonhistorical supervenient base, we need to understand the plastic, functional,
teleological, or goal-directed nature of molar behavior in order adequately to under-
stand, explain, manipulate, and predict it.
A crucial point that Enc and Adams miss here along with Enc, however, is that
whether we need information about relevant historical properties in order to under-
stand the plastic, functional, teleological, or goal-directed nature of molar behavior is
a contingent matter that depends on how much information we have about relevant
nonhistorical properties. Enc and Adams seem to miss this point for the same reason
that Enc misses it: an unfair comparison between specific muscle movements and
precisely describable limb trajectories (or between “external causes” and “behavioral
effects”, Enc and Adams 1992, p. 650), on the one hand, and an historically informed
teleological conception of goal-directedness, on the other hand. As pointed out above
in the case of Enc, a more fair comparison consists in contrasting the historical alter-
native with a nonhistorical one that includes all relevant nonhistorical properties, such
as internal causes or properties of nervous systems as well as any causally relevant
contemporaneous relational and extrinsic properties. Enc and Adams seem to claim
that this is not possible, which is tantamount to premise two of the indispensabil-
ity argument. Please note that the indispensability argument is discussed and argued
against: here in Sect. 3.3.1, above in Sects. 3.2 and 3.3, and below in Sect. 3.3.2.
Enc (1995) goes one step further than Enc and Adams (1992). Enc (1995) stops
using the term ‘heuristic’ and redefines the supervenience base of molar behavior to
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include essentially the historical properties. The additional data that he considers in
the 1995 paper, however, does not appear to suggest that the historical properties serve
anything more than a heuristic role which we may or may not need depending on our
knowledge of relevant nonhistorical properties.
3.3.2 Elder’s version of the indispensability argument: another brief
(and similar) case study
Elder claims that certain historical properties are essential to the products of natural
selection and similar copying processes. He calls these products members of ‘copied
kinds’. He bases his argument for this claim on a certain kind of warrant that we have
for engaging in inductive practices generally, and in making accurate predictions par-
ticularly, about members of copied kinds (Elder 1995, pp. 516, 522; 1996, pp. 192,
194–196, 198; Griffiths 1996, pp. S5–S6; 1999, pp. 215–219).17
In order to understand Elder’s examples, we need briefly to sketch which histori-
cal properties he believes are essential to members of copied kinds. Elder’s detailed
discussions come down to two kinds of relevant historical properties. The first kind
involves a past process of copying from previous members that historically served
specific useful functions. The second kind involves past cooperating devices of other
copied kinds that helped produce the sort of effect for which the copying process
selects. In other words, we are talking about the historical properties of a past copying
process of a certain kind and a past environment of a certain kind. Roughly speaking,
we are talking about the historical properties about past selection in virtue of which
biological devices and human artifacts have ‘proper functions’ (Millikan 1989). These
historical properties about past selection are supposed to (1) warrant predictions about
members of copied kinds, and (2) be essential to members of copied kinds.
Two of the main examples that Elder uses to make these claims involve the mating
dances of stickleback fish. The first example involves a mating dance of male stickle-
backs whose proper function is the fertilization of female stickleback eggs. The second
example involves a dance whose proper function is to mesmerize tasty flies so that it
is easier for the fish to catch the flies for food.
As regards the first example, Elder (1995, p. 195; 1996, p. 522) argues that if and
when variations arise in the egg laying dispositions of female sticklebacks, then we can
warrantedly predict that the future choreographic details of male stickleback dances
will differ in ways that are responsive to those changes in the females. As regards
the second example, Elder (1996, p. 522) argues that if and when the neural routines
of tasty flies become more sophisticated, we can warrantedly predict that the future
choreographic details of the dances will differ in ways that are responsive to those
changes in the flies.
17 In fairness, I should point out that Elder has continued to develop his views in a series of publications.
For instance, see Elder (2004). Nonetheless, even in more recent work, Elder (2004, p. 133) refers back
to the publications discussed here (Elder 1995, 1996) for support or elaboration. Still, to be fair, I should
also point out that Elder continues to develop his views in numerous publications that deserve independent
discussion.
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Elder (1995, p. 522; 1996, pp. 196, 198) also seems to use examples like these
to make a similar point about warranted prediction. Suppose that the male stickle-
backs from the first example developed their mating dance on another planet called
Twin Earth, and that the sticklebacks from the second example developed their fly
mesmerizing dance on Earth. On Earth, past dances often enough brought about the
fertilization of stickleback eggs because the dances were performed in the presence of
female sticklebacks that were disposed to respond by laying eggs. Similarly, on Twin
Earth, past dances often enough helped the fish catch flies for food because the dances
were performed in the presence of flies that were disposed to respond by hovering
around the dance. Suppose further that the choreographic details of these stickleback
dances are the same on Earth and Twin Earth.
If we transport the Twin Earth mating dance sticklebacks to Earth, we may expect
them to end their dances with futile snapping at nonexistent flies, but we cannot war-
rantedly predict that the choreographic details of their dances will differ in response
to variations in the egg laying dispositions of female sticklebacks. Similarly, if we
transport the Earth fly mesmerizing dance sticklebacks to Twin Earth, we may expect
them to end their dances with the untimely release of sperm, but we cannot warran-
tedly predict that the choreographic details of their dances will differ in response to
variations in the neural routines of tasty flies.
In making these claims about what we can and cannot warrantedly expect or pre-
dict, Elder makes two assumptions. The first assumption is that we have adequate
knowledge of three things: (1) the selective or copying history of each respective
stickleback dance, (2) the features of the past environment that played one or more
roles in the selection or copying processes of each dance, and (3) the features of the
present environment that are similar and different in relevant ways from features of
the past environment. The second assumption that Elder makes about what we can
and cannot warrantedly expect or predict is that we do not have adequate knowledge
of two things: (1) the nonhistorical properties of the sticklebacks that make causal
contributions to their behavior, and (2) the features of the nonhistorical environment
that make causal contributions to the stickleback behavior.
As explained in Sects. 3.2, 3.3, and 3.3.1, we have reason not to accept Elder’s
second assumption. As our information about the nonhistorical properties of the stick-
lebacks increases, our need to appeal to the historical properties of the sticklebacks in
order to predict their behavior decreases.18 To be sure, in many cases we have reason
not to accept Elder’s first assumption. This is the point of exhibit (C) from Sect. 3.2. It
is through the study of various nonhistorical properties that we learn about historical
properties as we make inferences to facts about the past (Davies 2001, pp. 55–56,
Chap. 5). Sometimes nonhistorical properties will serve as a better guide than histor-
ical properties even when our knowledge of nonhistorical properties is incomplete.
For our knowledge of historical properties can be incomplete as well (Turner 2005).
In these cases, experimental measurements, trial and error in conditioning, and study-
ing nonhistorical properties may be useful if not required (Amundson and Lauder
1994, pp. 459–463; Lauder 1995; Davies 2001, pp. 119–120). The time and resources
18 As noted in Sect. 3.3.1, Enc and Adams (1992, pp. 649–650) share Elder’s skepticism about this claim.
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required for trial and error may be as costly as the time and resources required to deter-
mine the relevant historical properties and facts about past selection. The disvalue of
these costs, and the level of time and resources involved, will vary in accordance with
technology, theoretical understanding, and research interests.
Elder (1995, 1996), Enc and Adams (1992), and Enc (1995) focus on behavior and
other products of historical processes that are functional. However, we can accept the
functional features of their examples without accepting their conclusions about his-
torical properties.19 The nonhistorical focus/approach need not object to or abandon
the use of teleology and goal directedness in functional analysis. The nonhistorical
focus holds that (1) historical properties are only sometimes instrumentally required
for the requisite functional analysis, and (2) a wide set of nonhistorical properties
that includes contemporaneous intrinsic, contemporaneous extrinsic, and contempo-
raneous relational properties is always causally responsible for any actual functional
activity.20,21
Elder (1995, p. 517) asks “…what is it, in the intrinsic shape of the mating dance of
a male stickleback fish, that gives this dance its characteristic role in the fertilization
of eggs from the female stickleback? Clearly such questions do not have answers.”
The apparent strength of this statement derives from the narrow focus on the shape
of the mating dance, just as the apparent strength of Enc’s arguments derives from
the focus on muscles and limbs. If we expand our focus to include all of the relevant
nonhistorical properties, such questions have clear answers. If we expand our focus to
include intrinsic properties of the male stickleback’s nervous and reproductive systems
as well as the environmental properties that consist in the intrinsic properties of the
nervous and reproductive systems of any female sticklebacks in the male’s environ-
ment, then we can see the role that the mating dance plays in the fertilization of eggs.
If we have enough information about nonhistorical properties, we can see this role and
make related predictions about it without any information about historical properties.
Elder (1996, p. 198) uses the same seemingly unfair comparison as Elder (1995,
p. 517) and Enc (1995). Elder and Enc both compare choreographic motions, on the
one hand, with choreographic motions and their history, on the other hand. As sug-
gested in Sect. 3.3.1, a more fair comparison consists in choreographic motions along
with many other relevant nonhistorical properties, on the one hand, and choreographic
motions and relevant historical properties, on the other hand. The need for informa-
tion about historical properties in explaining functional behavior and making accurate
19 For a nonhistorical account of function, see Cummins (1975, 2002) and Davies (2000). Davies (2001)
contains my favored nonhistorical alternative to historical accounts of function. However, I intend my claims
here to be neutral between alternative nonhistorical accounts. See Hardcastle (1999) for general discussion.
20 For further discussion, see Bechtel (1986) and Mundale and Bechtel (1996), and Bechtel and Mundale
(1999).
21 These points need not rely on a false dichotomy between historical and nonhistorical accounts of func-
tion. As Enc and Adams (1992) argue, for instance, historical accounts of function (often) seem well suited
to answering certain explanatory questions about populations, on the one hand, and nonhistorical accounts
of function (often) seem well suited to answering certain explanatory questions about individual organisms
or individual biological devices, on the other hand. This distinction is roughly analogous to the one adapted
from Waters (1998) in Sect. 2 between generalizations about distributions and generalizations about causal
regularities. Recall that historical properties are essential to generalizations about distributions and that
nonhistorical properties are essential to generalizations about causal regularities.
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predictions about it arises on the former comparison but not the latter one. This need
for information about historical properties is based on our contingent epistemic needs
that change in accordance with our knowledge of nonhistorical properties. As sug-
gested and explained in Sects. 3.3 and 3.3.1, it seems a plausible conjecture that the
essential properties of things outside of our minds should not depend on the changing
epistemic needs inside of our minds. If the former did depend on the latter, then the
essential properties of things outside of our minds would change as our knowledge of
nonhistorical properties changes, which seems implausible.
4 Conclusion
In the terms from Sect. 2, although historical properties are essential to the distri-
bution of members of historical kinds, they are also essential to the distribution of
members of eternal kinds. Similarly, although nonhistorical properties are essential to
the causal behavior of members of eternal kinds, they are also essential to the causal
behavior of members of historical kinds. Likewise, although historical properties may
serve a heuristic role in predicting and explaining the causal behavior of members
of historical kinds, they may also serve a heuristic role in predicting and explaining
the causal behavior of members of eternal kinds. In other words, history makes the
same difference to biological and psychological subjects as it does to other kinds of
subjects. Thinking otherwise runs into the confusion and the dependence problems.
The point is not that history is not special. The point is that history is equally special
to all things in the world when it comes to their distributions and that people may or
may not need knowledge of history when studying any causally active parts of the
world, depending on how much information and knowledge they have or lack about
the relevant nonhistorical properties contributing to the causal activity under study.
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